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ABSTRACT
This paper reports the first stage of a project to recover Argentine stock market data for the entire
20  century.  We find that real rates of return on Argentine stocks and bonds after 1920 were
th
above those in the Belle Époque, and that they were consistent with the view that in the postwar
period Argentina remained firmly integrated with international financial markets.1
ECONOMIC GROWTH IN ARGENTINA IN THE PERIOD 1900-30:
SOME EVIDENCE FROM STOCK RETURNS 
INTRODUCTION
This paper is a preliminary report on stock market returns to equity issues in Argentina in
the period from 1900 to 1930.  It is part of an ongoing project aimed at recovering aggregate
financial data for Argentina for the entire 20th century.  This particular part of the project is an
effort to shed some light on the controversy surrounding the economic growth trends prevailing
in that country at the beginning of the 20th century, especially after WWI. 
In particular, Di Tella and Zymelman (1967) argued that Argentina experienced a
significant slowdown in economic growth after WWI. However, in one of the most thorough
studies of Argentina’s economic history, Díaz Alejandro (1975) argued that that country's
performance in the 1920s was one of continued strong growth. In particular, he showed that,
accounting for the understandable and temporary disruptions associated with WWI, Argentina
did well in this period by comparison with Australia and Canada.  His work is in line with that of
Prebisch (1929), who argued that real economic activity in the late 1920s had exceeded that of
the prewar period. More recent work, however, has come to dispute this view. Using the
performance of OECD countries after WWI as a benchmark, Alan Taylor (1992) has argued in an
influential study that 1913 marks the high tide of Argentine economic performance. Recent
revisions of Argentina's GDP estimates from the beginning of the 20th century by Cortés Conde
(1994) point in the same direction.  
The question of what marked the end of Argentina's Belle Époque -- the period of rapid2
growth from the turn of the century to the eve of the First World War --  holds implications for
the politically charged issue of the wisdom of government policies in response to the challenges
Argentina faced in the interwar years: the exhaustion of economically useful land to continue the
expansion of the primary sector and the decline of England, Argentina’s chief financier. The
collapse of the international gold standard hindered not only international trade but also the
inflow of capital to settler economies such as Argentina, Australia, and Canada. Were these
temporary factors responsible for Argentina’s poor economic performance during the interwar
years? Or were, as maintained by Di Tella and Zymelman, misguided policies responsible for a
"Great Delay" that lasted until 1933? The answers to these questions hold the key to the critical
evaluation of the inward-looking policies and import-substitution policies adopted after the Great
Depression. After all, as Taylor pointedly notes, "If economic failure can be said to predate the
adoption of import-substitution doctrines, the structuralist camp can evade responsibility for
decline and implicate the liberal, export-oriented policy regime prevailing until 1929."
The preliminary results presented in this paper are part of a wider research project that
attempts to answer the questions above and  related ones with the use, to our knowledge for the
first time, of a large data set that will eventually make it possible to compute rates of return to
equity in Argentina from 1900 to the present.
The motivation for the part of our project presented here is that corporate equity prices
and dividends tend to reflect the actual and prospective changes in the rate of expansion of the
economy. Thus, stock returns may, in principle, serve as an additional indicator of contemporary
sentiment on the expected return to capital during the interwar periods.  This may indirectly shed
light on the economic development and long-term growth prospects of the Argentine economy in3
this period, as Sylla et al. (1994) have shown for the United States economy and financial
markets.
 Particularly important for the controversy surrounding Argentina’s growth after WWI is
that the pricing and other characteristics of financial assets can provide crucial information on
Argentine firms’ access to international capital markets. Taylor has argued that credit constraints
in the international capital markets after WWI forced Argentina to slow down its domestic
investment to rates sustainable with its relatively low domestic savings capacity. A break of  this
type in Argentina’s linkage with international capital markets would be reflected, in principle, in
higher ex ante real interest rates and returns to equity relative to those prevailing in international
markets.
The evidence from stock returns does not point in that direction. In particular, real rates of
return to equity and dividend/price ratios in Argentina were not obviously different from those
prevailing, for example, in the US. The stock market data confirm, as is well known, that
Argentina, along with other settler economies, did take an unusually big hit in the Great War and
that economic conditions in its aftermath were perhaps not as rosy as Díaz Alejandro believed.
But the financial data argue clearly that Argentina was by no means excluded from international
capital markets. On the contrary, the data indicate that Argentina was better integrated into world
capital markets in the last half of the 1920s than it was before the Great War.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section I presents the relevant economic
history background, Section II describes the data and methodology used to compute rates of
return on stocks, Section III presents the results, and Section IV concludes.
SECTION I.  The Slowdown Controversy 4
Between 1900 and 1930 total Argentine output grew at 4.6 percent per annum. Most of
this growth can be explained by standard neoclassical growth accounting. In that period, capital
grew at an annual rate of 4.8 percent and unadjusted labor input at the annual rate of 3.1 percent.
Giving to the contribution of capital a weight between one-half and one-third, and to that of labor
one between one-half and two-thirds, the unexplained residual would be limited to between 14
and 20 percent of the growth rate.  Total factor productivity, thus crudely measured, would lie
between  0.6 percent to 0.9 percent annually. This residual is not very far from the annual rate of 
0.9 percent that Solow (1957) found in his original study of the United States for the period 1909
to 1929.
Di Tella and Zymelman claimed that Argentine growth slowed down significantly after
WWI. They reported data from ECLA (1959), according to which the average annual growth rate
in the period 1900-04/1910-14 was 6.3 percent, while only 3.5 percent in the period 1910-
14/1925-29 (these are growth rates between levels of five-year averages). But Díaz Alejandro
argued that the slowdown in the second period disappears if one excludes the period 1913-17,
during which GDP fell almost 20 percent. The decline in this period reflected the result of
unusual circumstances rather than a permanent change in the dynamic forces propelling the
Argentinean economy: the European monetary tightness of the second half of 1913, which
reduced capital inflows, the crop failures of 1914, and finally the outbreak of the war. Otherwise,
the expansion for the period 1917-29, as reported by Díaz Alejandro, was brisk:
1918-19-20: 9.8 percent per annum
1921-22-23: 7.2 percent per annum
1924-25-26: 4.1 percent per annum5
1927-28-29: 6.0 percent per annum
Although GDP growth was highest in the early recovery years, the figures above do not
lend much support to the idea of a clear-cut slowdown with respect to the period 1900-14.
The "slowdown" hypothesis has resurfaced, however, after Cortés Conde (1994) re-
estimated GDP for the period 1875-1935, correcting the shortcomings allegedly present in the
ECLA methodology. According to his figures, real GDP grew at an average annual rate of 8.3
percent between 1900-13 and at the much slower rate of 4.3 percent in the period 1917-29. The
slowdown also shows up, albeit less dramatically, in the figures for real GDP per capita: 4.3
percent annual growth in the first period against 3.3 percent in the second.
Cortés Conde's findings, however, do not necessarily lend support to Di Tella and
Zymelman's hypothesis that the slowdown was the result of misguided policies. After all, as Díaz
Alejandro has pointed out, if Argentina's growth slowed down after WWI, the same was true of
Canada and Australia, the three countries reflecting the worldwide economic conditions of low
British economic growth and low European population expansion between 1913 and 1929. 
Alan Taylor (1992), however, has questioned that comparison on the grounds that  it 
entails "mutual flattery among  a group of poor performers"  (p. 910) because those three
countries (along with Mexico and the Philippines) were the five hardest hit by the effects of
WWI. He goes on to show that the closest Argentina got to the income per capita of the OECD
countries was in 1913. Taylor points out that Argentina’s domestic savings rate was low even
relative to Canada and Australia and attributes the ultimate decline of Argentina's growth after
WWI to Argentina’s dependence on foreign capital. Thus, Taylor seems to side with Di Tella and
Zymelman in that a "vulnerable growth strategy,"  that is, excessive reliance on foreign savings6
before WWI, was ultimately responsible for the slowdown of Argentina’s economic growth.
From this argument, it is not clear what fraction of the common fates of Argentina,
Canada, and Australia is attributable to a lower demand for capital and which part to a lower
supply of it. In this regard, the decline of England as an international supplier of capital coincided
with factors, such as changing patterns of world trade and the closing of the Argentine frontier,
that would qualify as downward shifts in the demand for capital.
The transition from Western European capital suppliers to American ones could be easily
associated with at least some form of temporary market incompleteness (Taylor’s maintained
hypothesis) and, therefore, with a rise in the cost of capital to Argentina above the one prevailing
in the world financial markets. In particular, Argentina’s financial markets after WWI should
have been associated with higher required returns to capital relative to the rest of the world. We
argue below that that was not the case.
Savings and investment
According to ECLA (1959, Cuadro 85, p. 71) gross fixed capital formation represented
on average 40 percent of GDP between 1900 and 1914 and about 30 percent between 1920 and
1929. Thus, it is clear that a lower equilibrium rate of investment occurred in the latter period.
But it is important to identify whether this decline resulted from a fall in the supply of  capital or
in the demand for capital, or both. 
High rates of investment associated with a rising capital/labor ratio during a growth spurt
need not be sustainable in the long run. And the capital/labor ratio in 1925-29 was indeed 46
percent higher than in 1900-04 (ECLA, 1959, Table XV of Appendix II). Consistent with these
figures, Taylor (op. cit., p.919) reports that capital stock per person was 36 percent higher in7
1913 than in 1890. Thus, the evolution of investment rates in Argentina in the period 1900-30 is
not inconsistent with the predictions of many standard models of economic growth (e.g.
Koopmans, 1965). In other words, it may have been unrealistic to expect that the investment
boom that characterized the years prior to the Great War would continue much longer. In this
sense, the investment slowdown of the 1920s could also be regarded as the natural course of
economic development and therefore does not provide any evidence that Argentina’s economic
policies prior to the Great Depression were misguided.
It is interesting to compare the estimates of investment rates reported above with the
savings rates calculated by Taylor. He reports savings rates of about 5 percent between 1900-30,
which suggests that a substantial fraction (about 85 percent) of capital accumulation after WWI
was still being financed from abroad. It is hard to see how Argentina could have been credit
constrained in international capital markets when it was able to finance abroad such a large
proportion of domestic investment. While it is true that placing debt on European markets
remained difficult, Argentine placements on domestic and the New York markets were
considerable. If there was a credit constraint in the late 1920s, it was not clearly evident to at
least one well-placed observer.
In the Economist of March 24, 1928, the Argentine correspondent, after noting the
successful placement of US $41 million in bonds of the Province of Buenos Aires on the New
York market at an average rate of 6.5 percent (replacing loans with average interest rates of 7.9
percent), asserted that Argentine domestic investors had a lending capacity appearing to be
“without a limit.... In round figures, the Argentine investor during the past ten years has absorbed
at least 1,500,000,000 paper [pesos] in the form of locally issued bonds...”  (Vol. 106, p. 599.)8
The magnitude of this figure may be compared against that of Argentina’s national debt, reported
as 2.6 billion paper pesos in December of 1927 (Economist, August 4, 1928, Vol 107, p. 234),
and Argentina’s nominal GDP, which averaged 7.4 billion paper pesos in the decade 1918-1927.
The correspondent’s report suggests that  domestic savings rates may not have been so low after
all, perhaps more in line with Díaz Alejandro’s estimate that domestic gross savings amounted to
around 10 percent of GDP in most years before 1930. But even this implies that about 60 percent
of postwar capital accumulation was financed abroad, still a large percentage for a country that
may have been credit constrained. Unfortunately, savings rates are notoriously difficult to
measure accurately, so additional evidence on domestic channels for capital is of value in this
controversy. Lacking a direct resolution of this issue, we must rely on other evidence to assess
whether Argentina had difficulties in accessing international capital markets after World War I. 
In that respect, there is another important difference between Taylor and Díaz Alejandro.
According to Díaz Alejandro, international capital markets for Argentina after WWI were free of
any significant frictions. He reports that Argentina’s creditworthiness, as measured by the market
yield of her bonds, was not very different from that of Canada and Australia during the 1920s. As
late as 1931 Argentina was able to roll over a loan at an interest rate only 90 basis points above
the average rate paid by the government of the United Kingdom. Díaz Alejandro (1975) reports
that, according to Wortman, in 1927 Argentina’s creditworthiness was ranked by British experts
as seventh among foreign countries.
By contrast, Taylor reports that according to Harold Peters (1934) and Vernon Phelps
(1938) , Argentina had limited success trying to raise funds from the New York money market
and that prior to 1923 advances could be obtained only over the short term and at high interest9
rates. In Taylor’s words (p. 922), "Unsuccessful attempts to raise funds in New York for several
years and the inability to attract new foreign additions to the capital stock caused Argentine
accumulation to limp along, relying on low rates of domestic accumulation to drive new
investment."  
  As emphasized earlier, the completeness of capital markets is important for the resolution
of this controversy, because the "efficient markets hypothesis" underlies the arbitrage condition
and similar ones typically used in models of asset pricing and analysis of  financial asset returns.
If markets are complete, arbitrage should result in equalization of expected rates of return across
capital markets and financial instruments, and the rate of domestic investment should be
unaffected by the local savings rate. On the other hand, informational or political barriers to
international capital mobility could prevent full arbitrage and lead to a relative scarcity of capital
in the credit-constrained economy, raising real expected returns to capital above those observed
in international financial markets.
The data on stock returns used in this paper can shed some light on this controversy. In a
frictionless world, the arbitrage condition implies that expected returns to equity and to other
capital instruments in Argentina should have been approximately the same as in the world stock
markets, especially in the stock markets of the emerging economies of the time. Substantial
differences would be consistent with the existence of significant frictions in international capital
markets.  With that goal in mind, in the next sections we report measures of real returns to equity
in Argentina in the period 1900-30 and other relevant stock market indicators.
Inflation rates and purchasing power parities
To measure real returns, we have to consider the reference market baskets of alternative10
investors, as purchasing power parity cannot be relied upon.  Table 1 shows consumer and
wholesale prices for Argentina (columns 1 and 2), and consumer price indexes for the US and the
UK (columns 3 and 4).  It also shows these price indexes for the US and UK in terms of
Argentine paper pesos, based on exchange rates (columns 5 and 6).
Note that the period from 1900 to 1913 is generally an inflationary one for Argentina. 
Using prices in the US and UK measured in pesos we see that US and UK investors lose less of
their peso returns in translating them into home goods than do Argentine investors, but the trend
is also generally inflationary.  Thereafter, inflation in Argentina is relatively slower than abroad,
while the Argentine exchange rate vis-a-vis the pound and dollar is trendless through 1929.  
Worldwide, the wartime inflation boom crests in early 1920.  There follows a sharp decline in
prices and a stabilization beginning around 1922. Broadly speaking, comparing the prewar period
to the postwar period, purchasing power held its own better in the 1920s than in the earlier
period.
SECTION II.   Description of the Data and of the Methodology of the Study
The sources of the primary data collected were The Review of the River Plate, the Boletín
Oficial de la Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos Aires, and El Monitor de Sociedades Anónimas.
These sources contain monthly observations on transaction prices on the Argentine Bolsa,
dividends paid, volumes traded, and firms’ capitalization. These comprise all listed shares,
including common equity and preferred shares, with dividends paid in notes convertible in gold
(gold pesos) as well as in fiat money (pesos moneda nacional.)
Statistics for each stock were constructed as follows.  Define:
P(t) = Price at the end of the year (last transaction price reported in the year);11
D(t) = Dividends during year (issued before last reported transaction price).
The dividend-price ratio is D(t)/P(t).  
Price indexes are constructed by taking the ratio of  average stock prices in year t and
dividing by the average stock prices in year t-1. These unweighted averages give the stock a
weight equal to its share price, so we call these share-price weighted indexes.
If a stock does not have a reported trade in both years (months for the eventual monthly
indicator), its rate of return is not calculated. Thus, we implicitly assume that reported stocks
reflect the return for stocks not reported. This assumption is not too bad inasmuch as reported
stocks are likely to be those stocks that are more widely held. However, it is likely to be biased in
that stocks with bad news or in bankruptcy are not included.  
SECTION III. Rates of Return on Argentine Debt Issues
Table 2 shows rates of return from a long-term instrument, the 1886-87 Argentina 5
percent custom loan regularly quoted on the London stock exchange market, from 1900 to 1913
(della Paolera, 1988) and from June 1920 to June 1928 (the Economist, last issue in June of each
year).  This “custom loan” was secured by Argentine custom receipts and was the largest loan
ever floated abroad by the Argentine government.  The second column shows the yields on
Argentine government consols on the domestic market from 1900 to 1913.  The third column
shows the Argentine prime rate from 1901 to 1930.  Columns 4 and 5 show rates of return of
British consols and on US 20-year corporate bonds.
Broadly speaking, world and Argentine interest rates were roughly the same or somewhat
higher in the period after 1922 than before 1914.  From 1901 to 1913, the custom loan yielded
just under 5.0 percent, and from 1922 to 1928 it yielded an identical amount.  Similarly, in the12
earlier period the prime rate averaged 6.3 percent and in the later 6.9 percent.  Over the period,
the spread between the custom loan and the British consol narrowed.  Thus, while it is evident
that there was some upward drift in the real interest rate in Argentina, its magnitude appears
small and in keeping with changes in the world marketplace, rather than suggesting an abrupt
change in Buenos Aires’s role therein.  For example, in New York, 20-year corporate bonds
yielded between 3 1/4 and 4 percent from 1901 to 1913, while they yielded between 4 and 5
percent from 1922 to 1929.  Indeed, if anything, we see that the British consol rate was drifting
higher with respect to long-term rates for US issues, while the Argentine custom loan and prime
rate were holding their own.  Thus the transition from British to US dominance of the capital
markets appears to have been a relatively smooth one for Argentine borrowing.
The size of the Argentine Bolsa
The Buenos Aires Bolsa had a market capitalization of between US $350 and $400
million  in 1929, when the GDP was roughly US $4 billion, so that the market capitalization was
roughly 10 percent of GDP.  In that same year, the market capitalization of the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) was $65 billion, when US GNP was $103 billion, or US market capitalization
represented over 60 percent of US GDP.   But the US stock market bubble in 1929 exaggerates
the size of the US market capitalization with respect to the economy.  For the NYSE, 1924 is
perhaps more representative, and in that year, market capitalization was 32 percent of GDP.  To
offer another comparison, the Italian stock market in 1992 had a capitalization of less than 15
percent of Italian GDP.
Two further points should be noted.  First, the Argentine stock market did not list the
major railway issues -- the Southern, the Western, the Pacific, and the Central.  Together, the13
Argentine railway issues had a market capitalization in 1929 of 92 ½ million British pounds, or
somewhat more than the market capitalization of the entire Argentine Bolsa. If we were to add
these issues to the Argentine stock market, its capitalization would rise to above 20 percent of
GDP. Second, we have included only ordinary stock, while the NYSE figures include preferred
as well.  
Table 3 offers a more formal comparison with modern emerging markets.  The table gives
market capitalization to GDP ratios for 18 non-OECD countries.  The median ratio is 21 percent,
which is similar to the capitalization of Argentina’s equity issues, including the railway shares, in
1929.
In sum, the market capitalization of the Argentine stock market was reasonably
substantial for an emerging market.  Although it did not represent Argentina’s foremost industrial
concerns, the railroads, it represented a high proportion of the remaining ones and a substantial
amount of asset values.  
Turnover on the Argentine Bolsa
Turnover -- the extent to which outstanding shares are actively traded -- varies
considerably across stock markets and within stock markets over time.  Trading on the Argentine
Bolsa represented some 5 percent of market capitalization during the 1920s, that is, on average
only 1 share in 20 turned over in a given year.  Again, this figure does not include the most
heavily traded issues, the railroads. In the hectic New York market of the 1920s, trading volume
sometimes more than equaled the market capitalization.  However, in the 1950s and 1960s,
trading volume on the NYSE was more like 15 to 20 percent of market capitalization, and today
it is roughly 50 percent.  In 1992, trading on the Italian stock market was 20 percent of market14
capitalization.  Table 3 shows that the trading turnover on modern emerging markets is about 20
to 25 percent.  
Thus the Argentine Bolsa’s trading rate in the 1920s was relatively slow, either by
contemporary standards or past ones, but by no means trivial.  While the Bolsa cannot be
considered highly liquid, it would be a mistake not to take seriously this market as a channel of
finance.  
Table 4 shows estimates of the volume of paper peso equity transactions on the Argentine
Bolsa from 1914 to 1930.  In nominal terms, volume peaked in 1918.   But the latter part of this
period was one in which the price level was falling, so in real terms, volume was close to
trendless.  It should be noted that the shares of the largest firms on the exchange traded regularly,
to the extent that a trade is recorded in virtually every week for which we have records.  This rate
of trade is certainly sufficient to provide a reasonable record of valuations.  
Rates of return on equity
Dividend-price ratio.   One measure of the expected return to stocks is the dividend-price
ratio.  If price movements are difficult to forecast, as one expects on an equity market,
movements in the dividend-price ratio may reflect changing ex ante returns to the market.  In this
respect, there do not appear to have been enormous changes in the ex ante returns on the
Argentine Bolsa.  Table 5 reports dividend-price ratios for a group of common stocks with
nominal capitalizations in excess of 10 million paper pesos.  Generally speaking, these represent
the bulk of the Bolsa’s market capitalization. 
Dividend-price ratios for the Argentine stocks were roughly 6 percent from 1906 to 1912,
in the Belle Époque, not far above the 4.7 percent average for US stocks in the same period. 15
From 1926 to 1930, Argentine dividend-price ratios were roughly 5 percent, a narrower spread
from the 4.4 percent average for US stocks in the same period.  The Argentine dividend-price
ratios in the late 1920s are also lower relative to returns on debt, both domestically and abroad
than in the Belle Époque.
There are two possible interpretations.  One is that ex ante required returns had fallen, if
price expectations were low.  Such an interpretation, of course, is inconsistent with the view that
costs of capital were unusually high for Argentina with respect to world markets during this
period.  The alternative is that Argentina’s stock prices were expected to appreciate substantially.
Let us now turn to ex post returns.
Price indexes.  Table 6 shows Argentine stock prices based on high market capitalization
stocks.  This index is constructed like the Dow Jones stock index, with the shares included
weighted by their share value.  From 1906 to 1912, in the Belle Époque, the real value of shares
on the Argentine stock market was roughly stable. After 1912, however, the stock market
dropped for two years and continued to sink until 1920.  Beginning in 1920, however, the stock
market stabilized and then rallied spiritedly from 1925 to 1928, and in 1930, the stock market
was still well above its level in the first half of the decade.   
There are thus grounds for suspecting that, although over the period as a whole stock
prices trended downward, expectations of price appreciation might have become a factor in
investment decisions in the latter part of the 1920s.  Such expectations of rising prices, with
implied increases in market valuations of firms, would not appear to be consistent with dismal
economic prospects.  
Table 7 shows the comparable price levels for the US stock market, as measured by the16
S&P index and deflated by the US CPI.  The comparison between the two series is made
graphically in Figure 1. Note that the US stock market price level fell, in real terms, slightly more
than the Argentine market from 1906 to 1920.  Thus, the equity market slide in Argentina was
mirrored in the US, yet the performance of the US economy during this period can hardly be
characterized as dismal.
We have also constructed a stock price index where the large capitalization stocks are
weighted by their market capitalization, as they are in the US S&P 500 index.  However, the
capitalization data are not reported as systematically before 1912 as they were thereafter. 
Moreover, a single entity, the Provincial Bank of Buenos Aires, represents most of the
capitalization of the stock market reported here from 1906 to 1914.  As a consequence, we view
the data, reported in Table 8, as primarily confirming the trends reported in Table 6.
Real rates of return. Table 9 presents real rates of return to common stock denominated
in domestic currency. The figures reveal that, on average, real rates of return were substantially
higher in the 1920s than in the period 1906-13. However, far from suggesting isolation of
Argentina from international capital markets in the 1920s, these figures are consistent with Díaz
Alejandro’s view that, in the late 1920s, Argentina was as firmly integrated with international
capital markets as ever: the increase in real rates of return to equity paralleled the one
experienced by the United States, as evidenced by the decade averages reported from Sylla et al.
(1994) reproduced in Table 9.  
British-owned Argentine railways.  In 1929, on the eve of the collapse of the international
commodity prices, the Argentine railways continued to trade at or above par on the London
market, having, if anything, risen in price over the past several years (Lewis, 1974, 1983.)  Thus17
Argentine equity issues appeared remarkably robust well after the end of Britain’s role as the
main supplier of capital and despite the rising pressure of increased real rates of interest on world
capital markets in the 1920s.  
SECTION IV. Conclusion
A preliminary analysis of returns to common stock in the Argentine Bolsa in the period
from 1900 to 1930 suggests that that rates of return to capital, be they in nominal or real terms,
reflected worldwide capital market conditions. Real rates of return in the period 1920-30 were
above those of the Belle Époque (1906-1912), but the implied increase in the cost of capital was
not out of sync with international capital markets. That is, stock yields right before the Great
Depression suggest that returns to capital investment in Argentina were not far from those that
investors would have obtained in world capital markets. This finding is consistent with Díaz
Alejandro's view that WWI left Argentina convalescent but firmly integrated in world financial
markets and ready to grow at a healthy pace without any need of drastic changes in the outward-
oriented, foreign-capital-friendly policies pursued until the Great Depression. 
It is our hope that the research agenda initiated with this paper will shed some light not
only on a particular period of Argentina's economic growth but also on the sources of growth in
general, as well as make a contribution to the better understanding of the so-called "emerging
economies" and their often puzzling capital markets.18
References
Brown, Stephen J., William Goetzmann, and Stephen A. Ross, "Survival," Journal of Finance 
50, July 1995, 853-73.
Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the United States:
Colonial Times to 1970, 1975,  US GPO, Washington, DC.
Cortés Conde, Roberto, "Estimaciones del Producto Bruto Interno de Argentina, 1875-1935."
Documento de Trabajo No. 3, Octubre 1994, Universidad de San Andrés, Buenos Aires,
Argentina
Díaz Alejandro, Carlos F.,  Essays on the Economic History of the Argentine Republic Yale
University Press, New Haven, 1975.
Di Tella, Guido and Zymelman, M., Las Etapas del Desarrollo Económico Argentino.
EUDEBA, Buenos Aires, 1967.
_____________________, "Argentina, Australia, and Brazil Before 1929," in D.C.M. Platt and
Guido Di Tella eds., Argentina, Australia & Canada. Studies in Comparative Development,
1870-1965, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1985.
Demirguc-Kunt, Asli and Ross Levine, “Stock Market Development and Financial
Intermediaries: Stylized Facts,” The World Bank Economic Review, May 1996.
Domenech, Roberto L., “Estaditicas de la Evolucion Economica de Argentina, 1913-1984,”
Estudios de IEERAL, 9, No. 39, July/September, 1986, 103-185.
ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America), “El Desarrollo Económico de la Argentina,”
in Análisis y Proyecciones del Desarrollo Económico, vol. 5, United Nations, Department of
Social and Economic Affairs, Mexico, 1959.
Feinstein, C.H., National Income Expenditure and Output of the United Kingdom, 1855-1965. 
Cambridge University, Cambridge, 1972.
Koopmans, Tjalling, “On the Concept of Optimal Economic Growth" in The Econometric
Approach to Developing Planning. North Holland, Amsterdam, 1965.
Lewis, Colin. M., British Railways in Argentina, 1857-1914.  Athlone, London.  1983.
____________,   British-Owned Railways in Argentina, 1857-1947, Ph.D. Thesis, University of
Exeter, 1974.19
Mitchell, B.R. and Phyllis Deane, Abstract of British Historical Statistics, Cambridge University,
Cambridge, 1962.
della Paolera, Gerardo, How the Argentine Economy Performed During the International Gold
Standard: A Reexamination, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Chicago, 1988.
Peters, Harold E., The Foreign Debt of the Argentine Republic, Baltimore, 1934.
Phelps, Vernon L., The International Economic Position of Argentina. Philadelphia, 1938.
Prebisch, Raul, “La Posicion de 1928 y las Variaciones Economicas de la Ultima Decada,”
Revista Economica 2, January 1928 pp1-8.
Solow, Robert M. “Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function,” Review of
Economics and Statistics, 39, 1957, 312-21.
Sylla, Richard, Jack W. Wilson, and Charles P. Jones, “U.S. Financial Markets and Long-Term
Economic Growth, 1790-1989,” in Thomas Weiss and Donald Schaefer, eds., American
Economic Development in Historical Perspective, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1994, pp.
28-52.
Taylor, Alan M., "External Dependence, Demographic Burdens, and Argentina Economic
Decline After the Belle Époque," The Journal of Economic History, Vol 52, 1992, pp. 907-36
Wortman, Charles, "Argentina, Australia, and Brazil: Bonds in the London Capital Market,
1929-39," unpublished manuscript, Yale University.20
Table 1. Price indexes
Year Argen WPI Argen CPI UK CPI US CPI UK PPP US PPP
1900 100 100 100 100 100
1901 88 99 100 99 100
1902 96 99 104 100 105
1903 91 100 108 98 106
1904 93 101 108 99 106
1905 101 101 108 99 106
1906 107 102 108 100 106
1907 110 104 112 103 110
1908 106 102 108 100 106
1909 116 103 108 102 106
1910 125 106 112 104 110
1911 124 107 112 105 110
1912 127 110 116 108 114
1913 127 100 112 119 110 117
1914 128 100 113 120 112 121
1915 137 107 136 122 132 120
1916 156 115 161 131 154 127
1917 194 135 194 154 179 145
1918 212 170 224 180 203 168
1919 219 160 237 207 205 198
1920 229 187 274 240 215 253
1921 182 167 249 214 255 278
1922 165 140 201 201 210 230
1923 172 137 192 204 216 246
1924 184 140 193 205 211 247
1925 187 136 194 210 198 216
1926 168 132 190 212 193 216
1927 165 131 184 208 179 203
1928 166 132 183 205 178 200
1929 161 131 181 205 178 202
1930 154 132 174 200 196 226
Sources: Argentina: before 1914, della Paolera; thereafter, Domenech.  UK: Feinstein. US:
Census Bureau21
Table 2. Interest rates on Argentine , UK, and US debt issues
Prime rate Custom Domestic UK US 20 Yr
loan bonds consols Corporate Year
1900 6.3 5.4 8.0 2.8 3.30
1901 7.1 5.2 7.8 2.9 3.25
1902 6.7 5.2 7.7 2.9 3.3
1903 5.3 5.0 6.4 2.8 3.45
1904 4.3 4.9 6.0 2.8 3.6
1905 4.7 4.9 5.9 2.8 3.5
1906 5.5 4.9 5.3 2.8 3.55
1907 6.5 4.9 5.6 3.0 3.8
1908 6.8 4.8 5.7 2.9 3.95
1909 6.3 4.8 5.4 3.0 3.82
1910 6.4 4.8 5.1 3.1 3.87
1911 7 4.8 5.2 3.2 3.94
1912 7.6 4.8 5.4 3.3 3.91
1913 7.7 4.9 5.4 3.4 4.02
1914 7.9 4.9 3.3 4.16
1915 7.6 3.8 4.2
1916 7.1 4.3 4.05
1917 6.8 4.6 4.05
1918 6.3 4.4 4.82
1919 7.2 4.6 4.81
1920 7.8 5.6 5.3 5.17
1921 7.7 5.4 5.2 5.31
1922 6.5 5.0 4.4 4.85
1923 6.5 5.0 4.3 4.68
1924 7.4 5.0 4.4 4.69
1925 6.9 5.0 4.4 4.5
1926 6.9 5.0 4.6 4.4
1927 6.3 4.9 4.6 4.3
1928 6.9 4.9 4.5 4.05
1929 6.9 4.6 4.45
1930 6.9 4.5
Sources: Argentina: Before 1914, de Paolera.  After, Boletin de Bolsa de Commercio de Buenos
Aires for prime rate and the Economist for custom loan.  UK Consols: Mitchell and Deane.  US
Corporates: Bureau of the Census.22
Table 3.  Modern Non-OECD Country Stock Market Indicators, 1986-93




















Median, Non-OECD .21 .235
Median, 23 OECD .24 .31
Source: Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996)23
Table 4.  Trading volume on the Buenos Aires Bolsa
Year Annual transactions volume Real transactions volume


















Source: Boletin de Bolsa de Commercio de Buenos Aires24
Table 5.  Dividend-Price Ratios for Large Capitalization Argentine Stocks
and US Stocks
Year Stock
Argentine Large Cap Stocks US Common
Mean  No. Of  Stocks Cowles
Commission
1906 .03 7 .040
1907 .09 7 .054
1908 .08 7 .049
1909 .06 7 .043
1910 .05 7 .048
1911 .06 7 .049
1912 .06 7 .049
1913 .08 7 .054
1914 .07 16 .050
1915 .08 16 .050
1916 .06 16 .056
1917 .12 16 .078
1918 .09 16 .072
1919 .09 16 .058
1920 .12 27 .061
1921 .07 27 .065
1922 .08 27 .058
1923 .06 27 .059
1924 .07 27 .059
1925 .06 27 .052
1926 .05 27 .053
1927 .04 27 .048
1928 .05 27 .040
1929 .05 27 .035
1930 .05 27 .043
Sources: Argentina: Authors’ calculations and US: Bureau of the Census.25
Table 6. Argentine Stock Market: 1906-1930
 .
Share-weighted Stock Indexes
Price Index, Nominal Price Index, Real No. of Companies
1906 100 100 7
1907  94  92 7
1908 100 101 7
1909 117 108 7
1910 123 105 7
1911 119 102 7
1912 123 103 7
1913 104  87 7
1914  83  70 7
1915  81  63 16
1916  82  56 16
1917  92  51 16
1918 117  59 16
1919 109  53 16
1920  86  40 16
1921  64  38 27
1922  63  41 27
1923  66  41 27
1924  65  38 27
1925  67  39 27
1926  73  47 27
1927  79  51 27
1928  87 56 27
1929  81 54 27
1930  67 47 27
Source: Authors’ calculations, real prices deflated by PPI.26


































Source: Bureau of the Census27
Table 8.  Argentine Stock Prices: Major Companies Weighted by Market Capitalization
Nominal Real No. of Companies
(1906=100)
1899 56.65 68.10 6
1900 61.70 66.02 6
1901 56.87 69.15 6
1902 57.00 63.53 6
1903 71.33 83.87 6
1904 80.99 93.19 6
1905 105.57 111.84 6
1906 100.00 100.00 6
1907 115.01 111.87 9
1908 131.47 132.71 9
1909 145.82 134.51 9
1910 176.78 151.32 9
1911 172.91 149.21 9
1912 162.74 137.12 12
1913 140.87 118.68 12
1914 123.95 103.62 12
1915 98.89 77.24 12
1916 99.33 68.13 12
1917 108.28 59.72 13
1918 127.94 64.57 13
1919 118.36 57.83 13
1920 102.78 48.02 16
1921 100.18 58.90 16
1922 107.35 69.61 16
1923 107.27 66.73 16
1924 111.14 64.63 16
1925 114.64 65.59 20
1926 121.88 77.63 20
1927 130.62 84.71 22
1928 146.77 94.60 24
1929 145.19 96.49 24
1930 127.92 88.88 2428
Table 9.  Average Annual Rates of Return to Argentine Stocks

























1930 -9.9 7.3 14.2
Sources: Argentina: Authors’ calculations US: Sylla et al (1994)29